The Future of Al Quds

and The Legal Protection of Holy Sites

By : Dr. Taj Eddine El Husseini(*)

Introduction

No one doubts that the issue of the future of Al Quds, and particularly that of its Islamic and Christian religious symbols is one of the essential elements in the political and religious conflict, and that both Palestinians and Israelis consider Al Quds as the capital of their political entities. No one doubts either that despite the judaisation claims maintained by Israel, Al Quds was and shall remain Arab, Islamic and with a prestigious past that goes back to the day in 638 A.D when the keys of the city were handed over to Caliph Omar Ibn Al Khattab. It is the first of the two qiblahs, the third holiest site and the destination of Prophet Mohammed’s (PBUH) Nightly Journey.

Although Muslims, Christians and Jews all believe in the religious, historical and civilisational position of Al Quds, Zionist attempts to usurp the holy city are always justified by claims of the existence of Jewish religious symbols, and marked by a tendency to shift the battle for the city from a conflict for political sovereignty to a religious battle that ultimately takes the dangerous twist of a religious war. Such a twist draws humanity into a vicious battle that plays divine religions against each other and may topple everyone in the quicksand of racism and extremism.

Radical platforms in Israel no longer veil their threat to blow up Islamic holy sites in Al Quds, including Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. It is high time such threats were taken seriously and genuine efforts were made towards finding the best means to guarantee the real protection of these holy sites.

We are convinced that real protection can only be achieved if an end is put to occupation and if East Al Quds finds its way back to Arab sovereignty. Nonetheless, the latest developments call for further caution. Postponing the issue of Al Quds until the last phase of the negotiations, the cessation itself of these negotiations, the unilateral decision of Sharon’s government to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, then the refusal to allow the burial of the leader Yasser Arafat in East Al Quds, are all indicators that the Israeli position will only grow more rigid and tyrannical.

Scenarios for the settlement of the issue of Al Quds waver between hope and despair. The realisation of any one of them will mean that Al Quds will either become a symbol of reconciliation and coexistence or one of tension and conflict.

Regardless of all this and irrespective of when the final settlement occurs, Israel will persist, in an unprecedented way, in its falsifications and in the obliteration of Islamic and Christian holy sites in the city. Israel is seriously and relentlessly pursuing this task, exploiting the factor of time to put Muslims and Christians and before them the Palestinian people, before the fait accompli.

Whatever the settlement scenarios that may be adopted in the future are, these challenges require that we seriously ponder the most efficient mechanisms that could be adopted at the legal and media levels to support Islamic and Christian holy sites in Palestine.

In this paper, I will attempt to address these questions through two axes. The first one concerns the future of Al Quds as seen from an objective perspective of the scenarios of the future. The second one defines the nature of the legal and media mechanisms that should bolster Islamic-Christian co-operation in the preservation of the identity of the holy city and the protection of its symbols to ensure that the city survives as the religious and civilisational melting pot of the three monotheistic religions.

Part I

Scenarios of the Future of the Holy City

The scenarios that we could perceive as possibly applicable in the future waver between hope and despair. The scenarios of hope are those pertaining to the application of the principles of justice, equity, the respect of the rules of international law and the resolutions of the United Nations. The scenarios of hope are no more than an expression of international legality, whether in terms of partition or internalisation.

The scenarios of despair are those consecrating the current status with all that entails in terms of usurpation, oppression, and negation of the rights of the Palestinian people and the Islamic and Christian nations. Whether this course is associated with a separation of what is religious from what is political, or whether it is limited to consecrating Al Quds as the unified and eternal capital of Israel, its eventuality involves not only a rift, but a genuine threat to regional and world peace.

First : Scenario of Internationalisation

The roots of this scenario can be traced to Resolution 181 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, issued on 29 November 1947. This resolution stipulated that Al Quds would serve as corpus separatum between the Arab and the Hebrew states, and would be governed through a special international system, by the United Nations and with the help of a Regency Council created for this purpose. By reviewing the premises of the above-mentioned resolution, it becomes clear that the resolution delineated the boundaries of the internationalised Al Quds in such a way as to comprise the municipality of Al Quds and the villages and towns surrounding it. Abu Deiss would be its eastern border, Bethlehem its southern one, Ain Karem its western border while Shaafat would be the northern one(1).

Despite the fact that the above-mentioned GA Resolution was not cancelled or amended subsequently, it was never implemented. In fact, Palestinian representatives at the Supreme Arab Committee outright rejected that resolution. Israel, which had proclaimed the creation of the Hebrew State, had already occupied a larger geographical expanse than was attributed to it under the Repartition Resolution.

On the other hand, the conclusion of the armistice agreement and the consecration of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and East Al Quds at that time made the UN Resolution seem outmoded in light of the reality on the ground.

Notwithstanding the positions expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions, none of the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict is keen on the internationalisation option, nor do they even bring it up for discussion. However, it is possible to detect a certain inclination towards a concept that is not totally dissimilar from that of internalisation, and which was tackled by the Pope when he received King Hassan II, the Moroccan Monarch and Chairman of Al Quds Committee : “It is clear to me that the holy city is truly a sacred heritage for the followers of the three divine religions, as well as for the whole world, and even more for the people residing in Al Quds. We need to explore this new thrust and new endeavour, seeking not division but a more sublime sense of brotherhood, and reach, with the help of the Lord a solution that may be unique, but final and that will be based on faith and rapprochement, and will guarantee the respect of everybody’s rights”(2).

Could this unique solution involve a newer concept of internationalisation? Or does the perception of the Catholic Church shun everything that is political and temporal, and consider that the desired solution involves only the rights of the followers of the divine religions to perform their rites in total freedom within the holy city. Perhaps, this last explanation is more in line with the stance of the Catholic Church which did not hesitate to sign an agreement with Israel despite the occupation by the latter of East Al Quds, providing for the protection of Christian holy sites, cultural exchange and the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

What reveals that the Church is not ready to play a decisive role in the settlement of the question of Al Quds, through an internationalisation model or other, is the undertaking by the Vatican through this agreement to remain absent from all temporal conflicts, a principle that is invoked in land and border disputes(3).

Second : The Repartition Scenario

This scenario is linked to the hypothesis of a return to the status that prevailed before the June 1967 military operations that resulted in Israel’s occupation of East Al Quds. Its bases are, on the one hand, the principles of international legality as expressed in all the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and decisions, and on the other, on the axioms of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation which has always considered the goal of its struggle to be the establishment of the independent State of Palestine with Al Quds as its capital. Although the different Palestinian, Arab and Islamic discourses continued to refer to Al Quds with no distinction between its eastern and western parts, it was always clear that the reference was to the eastern part that was occupied by Israel in 1967, and even more so after the PLO accepted the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 recognising the state of Israel.

At the Arab level, it was observed that the Final Communiqué of the 1998 conference of the Arab League, held in Cairo, used for the first time the phrase ‘Arab Jerusalem’ when talking about the establishment of the State of Palestine, the reference being to East Al Quds.

To consider East Al Quds the capital of the State of Palestine is fully compatible with UN resolutions.

The UN General Assembly had previously issued a resolution on 04/07/1967 calling upon Israel to invalidate all the measures taken with the purpose of modifying the legal status of Al Quds, and to refrain from such actions in the future(4). The General Assembly, along with the Security Council, also considered that the organisation of a military parade in Jerusalem was illegal and requested that Israel put an end to such practices(5).

Furthermore, the Security Council reaffirmed, in a resolution adopted on 21/5/1968 on Jerusalem, that taking control of the lands by military incursion was an illegal act, and requested that Israel refrain from any act likely to alter the status of Jerusalem(6).

The same stance was adopted in the Security Council resolution issued following the burning of Al Aqsa Mosque, which considered Israel a force of occupation and requested it to adhere to all the resolutions issued thus far with regard to the holy city(7). This was further confirmed in subsequent GA resolutions as well as those of some specialised UN affiliated organisations, such as UNESCO.

The stance of the Security Council was made even clearer when it took a decision in 1980 (august 20th) not to recognise the basic Israeli law on Al Quds and called upon all countries to withdraw their diplomatic representation from there(8).

It would be safe to say that since 1967, the United Nations Organisation has considered East Al Quds a zone under military occupation, and expected the occupying country to adhere to the provisions of international law in such cases, including the Geneva Convention of 1949. The UN systematically condemned the measures, whether administrative, political or military, taken by Israel with regard to East Al Quds. In fact, those decisions and resolutions were no more than a reflection of the will of the entire international community, having been most often adopted with a clear majority and little opposition, and for most Security Council decisions, unanimously.

Thus, we can say that the repartition scenario enjoys great support within international laws, and is largely favoured at the United Nations Organisation. Military occupation does not automatically entail a transfer of sovereignty from the zone’s legitimate sovereign party to the occupying force. Instead, the latter acquires temporary authority that enables it to administer the area. If Israel has attempted to justify its annexation of Jerusalem with such theories as filling a sovereignty void, pre-emptive self defence and the non-existence of prior ownership, international jurisprudence has proven beyond doubt the unsound reasoning of such theories and their lack of solid legal grounds(9).

We may now wonder whether the declaration of principles and the transition period agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian parties will allow for the possibility of a reclaiming of East Al Quds to be the capital of the Palestinian State. By virtue of the transitional period agreement signed by the two parties in Washington on 28/9/1995, the 4th of May 1996 was agreed upon as a kick-off date for the negotiations, on condition that these negotiations tackle issues that have not been addressed in the declaration of principles, most prominent of which is the issue of Al Quds. The third article of the declaration of principles agreement stipulated the organisation of free, direct and general elections aimed at establishing a transitional independent government authority : ‘the elected council”. The following article of the agreement provided for a special agreement that defines the nature and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol appended to the declaration of principles. The first article of this appendix stipulated that the Palestinians residing in Al Quds would have the right to participate in the electoral process by virtue of an agreement between the two parties. The second appendix of the transitional period agreement stipulated that all Palestinians will be given the right to participate in the election either as voters or as candidates.

The developments that unfolded on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict scene after the failure of all settlement efforts, including the Road Map proposed by the American Administration, have clearly shown that Israel will persist in its total rejection of any partition of the city. The isolated and unilateral decision of Sharon’s government to withdraw from the Gaza Strip is an indication of this tendency, as is the refusal to allow the burial of Leader Yasser Arafat in East Al Quds, and the uncompromising refusal to allow Jerusalemites to participate in electing a Palestinian president during the elections scheduled in the few coming weeks.

Yet, and despite all these obstacles, adherence to international legitimacy and the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the acceptance of the principle of Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, still places East Al Quds among the priorities to be addressed during the final negotiations.

It is clear from the above that the hypothesis of the partition and the recovery by Palestinians of East Al Quds is an acceptable one in terms of the principles of international law that reaffirmed in UN resolutions or even within the negotiations’ framework opted for by the Israelis and the Palestinians. The only obstacle standing in the way of this solution is the obstinate position of the Israeli government in the final stages of the negotiations. This position is likely to shift the conflict from its legal framework to a new one where the quest is more about how to redress the imbalance of powers in the region. In fact, the outcome of any negotiations is the best indicator of the balance of powers prevailing at the time of these negotiations.

Third : Scenario of the Status Quo

Immediately after occupying East Al Quds in June 1967, Israel took several measures aimed at modifying the legal status of Al Quds and its demographic and political reality.

Thus, the Knesset proceeded to the amendment of the Israeli governing and legal laws to be able to apply government rules over all the areas considered part of Israel’s “land”. The law regulating municipalities was also amended so that their jurisdictions could be expanded.

Subsequently, the Israeli government issued a decree providing for the application of Israeli law in East Al Quds, and placing the eastern part under the jurisdiction of West Al Quds. Israeli authorities also allowed Palestinians to obtain Israeli nationality upon application. The residents of Al Quds who did not obtain that nationality were considered as permanent residence permit holders.

The situation escalated to a peak in 1980 when Israel decreed the basic law dubbed “Jerusalem the Capital of Israel”, which confers a legal aspect on the annexation process by describing Al Quds as the unified capital of Israel, and the seat of the government, the Knesset, and the supreme court(10).

The position of Israeli political parties on this issue do not differ that much. The Labour Party’s principles, adopted before the legislative elections of 1992, stipulate that “Jerusalem and its surrounding areas are not a political or security issue. Jerusalem is the soul of the Jewish people, the capital of Israel, and shall remain a unified city under Israeli sovereignty”(11).

The stance of the Likud Party is no different from the Labour Party’s programme as it also declares that “Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel. It is a city that cannot be divided and guarantees freedom of access to the holy sites to all faiths”.

Thus, it becomes obvious that Israel’s willingness to include the issue of Al Quds in the final settlement negotiations was only a tactical move that is part of Israel’s comprehensive strategy of consecrating and maintaining the status quo against all parties in the conflict.

One also observes that in practical terms, the Likud government follows the same path charted by previous governments, staving off negotiations on Al Quds while, at the same time, consecrating geographically and demographically Israeli predominance, going ahead with construction works in all neighbourhoods of the city and laying surrounding roads.

The construction plan devised for Abu Ghnaim Mountain was an additional measure aimed at building six housing units that would close the circle of Israeli settlements around Al Quds and isolate it definitively from the West Bank.

The situation imposed by Israel is rejected by the international community and runs counter to the principles of international law. Most foreign embassies have refused to relocate to Al Quds and a number of countries opened two consulates, one in East Al Quds and the other in West Al Quds. However, a dangerous development was observed in the issue, namely the radical turnabout observed in the stance of the United States of America vis-à-vis the issue. Indeed, the American Administration has begun to negate the principle of international legitimacy upheld by the UN since the Carter Administration, particularly with regard to Al Quds and geographical governance. The American administration has equally retracted the contents of the Letter of Guarantees offered to the Palestinian party when the Americans underlined, in a document published in July 1993, that “the issue of Jerusalem will not be addressed during the transitional period”.

The American position believes in a unified Al Quds and accepts the Israeli sovereignty over it’, thus contradicting their declared adherence to all international legitimacy resolutions(12).

One may read in the perpetual competition between Republicans and Democrats that the American Administration, irrespective of its political affiliation, will always remain weak in front of the Israeli lobby, in addition to the two political parties’ consideration of Israel as a strategic ally of the United States of America, whose support is inherent in America’s vital interests(13).

The vote of the American Congress and its approval of the transfer of the American Embassy to Al Quds, the thought-provoking shifts detected in the official American position towards endorsing the Israeli occupation of the holy city, particularly after the events of 9/11, are all factors that give rise to many questions about the credibility of Americans as an honest broker of the peace process and about its role as a neutral and objective referee in the conflict.

It is safe to say that the scenario of the status quo is likely to prevail in the light of the current international situation, marked as it is by the global tipping of the balance of powers in favour of the United States. The Uni-Polar system not only means the monopoly of the United States of military and strategic superiority over the other rivals, but also entails its ability to directly intervene in any part of the world, and even its ability to readjust the principles of justice, equity and self-determination to better serve its interests and those of its allies.

Does this mean that the status quo will be the fate of the Palestinian people, and after them of all Muslims and the international community, all of whom have to endure its repercussions and accept its implications ?

There is no chance of triggering change without seriously pondering the mechanisms for Arab and Islamic solidarity, winning over new allies, the most important of whom remains the European Union, fully grasping the real danger of the American role, and positively interacting with it.

Notwithstanding this, any hypothesis for reversing the current course of events and the status quo is linked to the sort of strategy that the Palestinian negotiator will use at the final stages of negotiation and the means of pressure and balancing he may have up his sleeves. These means should not be limited to the Palestinians, but rather promoted by all Arabs and Muslims, and through the good-intentioned efforts of the international community, particularly the European Union.

Fourth : The Open City Scenario

In addition to the scenarios that derive their support and justification from the reality on the ground or from justice and law, there are a number of other ideas that preach an open city of Al Quds. A representative of the Palestinian people once said that the Palestinians may accept that Al Quds remain a unified city with the right of access given to all, on condition that Israel recognises the principle of Palestinian sovereignty on the territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the eastern part of the holy city.

Ahmed Qorei says that its is possible to reach any form of agreement about Al Quds, including the setting up of a joint municipality, if Israel accepts the principle of Palestinian sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty being the key to all unresolved problems.

Although the Palestinian representative admitted that all the negotiations that have taken place so far on the issue of Al Quds were not of an official nature, they still were not a mere intellectual exercise.

In the same vein, Sari Nusseibeh, an Al Quds resident who was a member of the circle close to the late PLO ChairmanYasser Arafat, believes that the non-official negotiations about Al Quds may be of help at the moment of the final settlement negotiations, including the possibility of Al Quds remaining physically unified, even if it is politically divided.

This idea is based on the possibility of dividing the city into autonomous municipal councils that would have representatives at the central municipal council, while both Palestinians and Israeli create branch municipalities the mission of which would be to manage and run the affairs of local councils. In this theory, the central municipal council would hold the prerogative of monitoring the activities and decisions of the branch municipal councils, both Israeli and Palestinian. The council would also be in charge of urban planning, water distribution....etc. This official adds that the Israeli territories in Al Quds would remain in this case under Israeli legislation while the Palestinian law would be applicable in East Al Quds. Palestinian and Israeli citizens would have total freedom to move in the holy city, and the necessary security and surveillance measures would be taken.

Should the security issue give rise to many problems in a city open in such a way, Sari Nuseibeh proposes that Al Quds be an arms-free city, it being the city of peace.

Looking at all these proposals, one cannot help but describe them as Utopian. In fact, they do not reflect with any of the de facto positions proclaimed by both the Palestinians and the Israelis, nor do they concur with what Israel forcibly imposes on the ground.

In a study written in 1995, Dore Gold demonstrates how the geographical and the municipal solutions can never be acceptable. The geographical solution, involving the division of the city into geographical lots according to the identity of the inhabitants may cause violent rifts and divisions within Israel. The municipal solution raises fears among the Israelis that it may be a prelude to a geographical solution and lead to the destabilisation of the existing demographic balance, and from there to a divided sovereignty(14).

In fact, this trend paves the way for a conception whereby Al Quds is religiously open but politically closed. Gold considers that the religious solution may guarantee the religious rights and interests of all religions and denominations, particularly with regard to the administration of religious sites in Al Quds. Some Israelis may go as far in the religiously open city concept as to grant holy sites in Al Quds the status of an independent entity supervised by representatives of the three religions or by an international body. Such a proposal would involve the loss of Al Quds from the hands of Muslims and Christians of Al Quds, and more so from the Palestinian people who see in Al Quds, sanctities, riches and human element included, the capital of the independent State of Palestine.

Having reviewed the various scenarios of the future, it becomes clear that the future stakes of the conflict will mainly boil down to a choice between maintaining the status quo, ensuring the continuity of the judaisation policies and the attempts to obliterate the religious and civilisational identity of the holy city, or dividing the holy city so that the eastern part can serve as the capital of the State of Palestine. This, in our opinion, is the best solution to guarantee the protection of Islamic and Christian holy sites in Palestine.

PART II

How to Ensure the Protection of Holy Sites

through Law and the Media

The historical development of the Middle East conflict has shown that the only beneficiary from the passage of time is Israel. Indeed, since 1948, it has occupied the western part of Al Quds, then the eastern part in 1967. Since then, it has intensified its judaisation, expropriation and destruction policies. It has demolished the Maghrebi quarter in East Al Quds, bulldozed the Arab Sharf neighbourhood, expropriated more than one hundred buildings in the old city, burnt Al Aqsa Mosque in 1969 and carried out a military attack on the Dome of the Rock in 1982. All the while, it continued its archaeological excavations around and underneath Al Aqsa Mosque despite clear evidence that all the vestiges found there date back to the Umayyad era(15). Compounding this situation, Israel continues to hinder the restoration and rescue operations, with clear contempt for the sentiments of Muslims and Christian around the world.

One of the most dangerous forms of judaisation perpetrated by Israel consists in obliterating the Islamic, Christian and Palestinian identity of Al Quds.

Delivering a lecture in Paris on “Al Quds : A History and an Identity”(16), the late Faical Al Husseini described these practices as falling within three categories :

First category : Isolation, isolating Al Quds from the Palestinian environment.

Second category : Displacement, evicting Al Quds inhabitants through physical displacement and economic deprivation. This involves stripping Jerusalemites of their identity and economic means by accusing them of residing in areas other than Al Quds.

Third category : Substitution, replacing the Palestinian inhabitants with Israeli settlers.

Obliterating the identity of the inhabitants of Al Quds runs parallel to the annexation of the old city, the destruction of Waqf property or stripping this property of its religious character, claiming ownership rights over cultural and religious monuments, altering their features, robbing their contents and transferring large parts of these contents to Israeli museums.

In Part One, we have mentioned that the best way to support and protect Islamic and Christian holy sites in Palestine is to put an end to occupation and the return of East Al Quds to Palestinian sovereignty. However, the fast-paced developments and the sustained judaisation and obliteration measures require that Muslims and Christians throughout the world take part in the formulation of an innovative global strategy for the protection and preservation of these holy sites.

Half the inhabitants of the globe are Muslims and Christians, and the vital issue today is how to sensitise each and every one of them about their position as active and efficient partners in the protection of sanctities.

The current policies cannot continue as they are now for the simple reason that their continuity will lead us into the trap of searching for the final settlement, a trap whose main ploy is to procrastinate and gain more time to complete the judaisation of the holy city and annihilate all the Islamic and Christian civilisation and religious heritage there.

The current juncture requires that decision makers in the Islamic and Christian world, and all the role-players of the civil society, formulate a fully integrated strategy for objectively and efficiently addressing the current situation which is marked by Israeli procrastination, American bias and international indifference.

Some of the priorities of these strategies, at the legal and media levels, can be defined as follows :

1- Conclusion of an international convention on the protection of holy sites

Since the creation of the United Nations Organisation, international law has acquired great importance in setting the rules governing relations between countries. Many international agreements, such as those on human rights, population and environment protection, have acquired a binding force in these relations.

However, international law is still deficient in terms of laws providing for the protection of religious and holy sites. The 1904 Hague Convention considered religious holy sites part of the cultural assets that are protected in view of their historical and religious significance for humanity.

Article 27 of the 1907 Hague Convention stipulates that in the case of siege or bombing, all necessary precautions must be taken not to harm places of worship. The Geneva Convention of 1949 banned the bombing of places of worship that represent the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. Article 53 of this Convention bans occupation forces from destroying any fixed or movable assets belonging to individuals or groups, unless the military operations justify this destruction.

It is clear from the above that the provisions of international law, which are also European in origin, have so far been unable to lay down strict rules for the protection of holy sites and their preservation under occupation or in time of war. This deficiency has had serious repercussions on holy sites in Palestine, Islamic and Christian alike.

It has therefore become the duty of the Islamic world, through the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, to seriously examine the possibility of concluding an international convention dedicated solely to the protection of holy sites. This is all the more important since it has become clear that Israel shrewdly exploits all the loopholes existing at this stage in international law.

This convention should contain a de facto provision that any act of violation undermining the sanctity of holy sites is an international crime. It should lay down the conditions for sanctioning individual acts, as well as for those committed by states.

Similarly, the convention can also expressly delegate competence to both the International Court of Justice and the Security Council to take deterring measures, and even to invoke the provisions of Article 7 of the United Nations Charter, considering the vital importance of the sanctity of holy sites for the followers of the three monotheistic religions, and their impact on international peace and security.

The chances of the conclusion and implementation of this convention remain highly strong, particularly if it is adopted by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference with its 50 Member States, by the Non-aligned Movement and by other peace-loving nations.

The UN General Assembly conferences which issue recommendations pertaining to the Middle East conflict are ample proof of the chances of success that this convention may have. It has become a tradition for the General Assembly to adopt these recommendations by near unanimous vote, often marred only by the Israeli and American opposition.

The conclusion of this international convention will transfer the sanction mechanism from UNESCO to the Security Council. It will also shift the legal competence for ruling in cases of crimes against holy sites from an internal body into the hands of the international judiciary system.

This crucial development is likely to act as a deterrent in dealing with the Israeli occupier who has so far been the only beneficiary from all the legal loopholes of international law.

2- Financial Support Mechanisms for the Protection of Holy Sites :

Several studies have pointed out that a group of Jewish capitalists in the United States have contributed towards the judaisation of Jerusalem with amounts exceeding by far the contributions made by Islamic governments towards the protection of holy sites(17).

If this is indeed the case, then there is a serious malfunction in the support mechanisms which Islamic countries provide for holy sites.

Despite the praiseworthy efforts of many institutions involved in this field, such as Al Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock Restoration Committee, created by Jordanian law in 1954, or Al Quds Fund set up by virtue of a resolution of the Conference of the Islamic Organisation, many of these institutions are plagued by the temporal and whimsical character of support initiatives, by the absence of co-ordination, and by the lack of putting into effect the measures to collect contributions and dues.

The mechanisms for protecting holy sites are not limited to the restoration, reconstruction and refurbishing works ; they also include bolstering the resistance of the Palestinian population against all temptations that may lead to their ceding lands to the enemy. These mechanisms also affect the media, and the activities of specialised international organisations, such as UNESCO. They may also be extended to cover research centres conducting historical and archaeological studies aimed at refuting all Zionist claims and at preparing a detailed atlas that truly reflects the situation of holy sites before and after Israeli occupation, and exposes in minutiae the dimensions of the judaisation plot hatched and implemented by Israel. The process may also involve the funding of a large international media campaign publicising the crimes and violations committed by the Israeli authorities against these sanctities and exposing their future evil intentions.

Initiatives such as this can be fruitful only if all efforts are combined under the umbrella of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to devise a legal framework that guarantees co-ordination among institutions, governments of Member States and local organisations which may constitute the backbone of the mechanisms for support in the future.

For these mechanisms to achieve a minimum degree of regularity and continuity, the Organisation may examine with Member States all the possibilities of automatic deduction, either of Zakat or other taxes, and of integrating these rules within the internal laws of Member States.

The regularity and sustainability of resources and the regulation of the mechanisms securing them through a convention instituted by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and integrated by all Member States, is likely to guarantee, in addition to the above, the outcome of these mechanisms, all the more since the American Administration has begun, since the 9/11 events, to point the finger at all Islamic charity or humanitarian activities.

3- A Legal Framework for Benefiting from the Arab and Islamic Presence in the West :

The Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and the Arab League all shoulder a fundamental responsibility in this regard.

The activities of Islamic non-governmental organisations based in the West have become the subject of suspicions, and many of them have been accused of terrorist involvement. This situation has only compounded the difficulties hindering all religious and civilisational activities, including those geared at the protection of holy sites.

The existence of a legal framework for the support activities aimed at the protection of holy sites has become a real necessity. This framework can be overseen through the official representations of these organisations and in co-ordination with the diplomatic missions of Islamic countries in the West.

To this effect, appropriate formulas must be identified to enable the Arab-Christian voice to be heard in the West by consolidating ties between the Church in Palestine and the Western Church institution, particularly in the United States. Thus, programmes can be formulated to encourage the Church in Palestine to host delegations form Europe, America and Australia. These delegations would take stock of the reality in Palestinian territories and of the ignominious distortion and destruction that target holy sites there.

We need to fully understand that the misconceptions under which Christian fundamentalism acts in the West are only the result of its ignorance of historical facts. In as much as it is the victim of premeditated deception of the Zionist lobby, it has also become an excellent tool for misleading decision makers.

The participation of Arab Christians in this project is essential. More efforts should be exerted to stem the immigration flow of Arab Christians to the West, as the persistence of this phenomenon represents a real threat to the rights of both Muslims and Christians.

Arab Christians can contribute to the creation of a permanent framework for Islamic-Christian dialogue, a framework that transcends the occasional and ephemeral gatherings, to draw up the outlines of a fully integrated plan for the protection of holy sites.

At an Islamic-Christian dialogue conference, organised in Bahrain in October 2002 , and which brought together a select group of scholars from both sides around the theme of “The Role of Religions in Peaceful Existence in Modern Societies”,  a clear stance was taken on the issue Of Al Quds when the participating scholars warned against using religion as a cover or a pretext for usurping property or attacking lives and holy sites, particularly those of Muslims and Christians in Al Quds Al Sharif(18).

Such conferences should evolve in terms of their mechanisms and modus operandi to an institutional level that prevents repetitions, duplication of efforts and ambiguity of objectives.  The more the involved parties, clerics, historians, sociologists.. etc  manage to unify their voices on the subject of dialogue, the better the chances of turning the outcomes they reach into  achievements that could be rationally and methodically invested in persuading and reshaping pubic opinion in the West.

4- Reformulating the Media Strategy for the Protection of Holy Sites

One of the most gratifying documents presented at the Conference was the paper by ISESCO emphasising in clear terms the need to reformulate the broad lines of the draft media plan for publicising the issues of Al Quds Al Sharif in the West and the mechanisms for its implementation.

We are all convinced that the power of the media has become unsurpassed at this age of globalisation where the international community, large as it is, has become more of a global village.

By allying itself with the radical Christian fundamentalism, the Zionist lobby has succeeded in the West, particularly in the United States, in controlling many media channels, and marshals them to serve its designs. This alliance has gained in danger and impact since 11 September 2001, with all the accusations of terrorism and radicalism levelled against everything related to Islam.

In the light of this new situation, it has become the duty of the Islamic community to seek to penetrate the media world in the West using new approaches that are based on the language of truth, bolstered by plausible arguments.

The achievements accumulated so far in terms of international legitimacy through the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council elections can serve as a basis for the media plan in explaining the repercussions of the Israeli onslaught on holy sites. This plan should take heed of the outcome of the Islamic-Christian dialogue on sanctities and make use of the results of the studies conducted by historians, geographers and sociologists about the Israeli ploys to obliterate the Palestinian identity and judaise the holy city. Another basis for the plan could be the preparation of a political, economic and social atlas that truly shows the dimensions of the judaisation plot targeting Islamic and Christian holy sites since 1948.

These aspects of the media plan’s essence that should be conveyed to the West cannot be properly developed unless a satellite channel targeting the West is created.  This channel would operate in English and other modern languages so that its impact can be greater. Thus, it will be able to forge a position on the media scene in the West where the only criteria for success are quality and competitiveness in reaching the audience.

This media orientation can also become a reality through penetration of the major Western satellite channels, if only through paid-for advertisements that convey clear messages, documentaries and analyses formulated in simple terms and with convincing arguments.

With the existence of many different media pulpits, it will be necessary - in addition to all that has been achieved by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in this regard- to open many other internet websites aimed primarily at bolstering the mechanisms for protecting sanctities, including publicising the true map of Al Quds in 1948, then in 1967, and clarifying the true intents of the judaisation plan which Israel has so far implemented.

Influencing the public opinion is achievable mainly through the media means, and this public opinion is what really defines decision-making as expressed through elections. We need to understand that no matter how powerful the means used by Israel and the Zionist lobby in the West, the door for initiative remains open to all, and we must utilise it in an appropriate way.

Conclusion :

The scenarios that we have addressed in Part I were not a mere intellectual exercise in guesswork about possible courses to be taken in the future. The realisation of any of them is conditional upon the balance of powers that will play out in the region and within the international community in the future.

Unfortunately, the developments unfolding now point towards the probability of the status quo scenario firmly prevailing at all levels. A situation like this is certainly based on the breach of all the principles of justice and equity and of the rules of international law.

Islamic and Christian holy sites in Palestine are the first casualties of occupation, followed by the compulsory displacement, illegal settlement, obliteration of the landmarks of the Islamic and Christian civilisations, and building the separation wall. Today, Israel is following a much more dangerous strategy which consists in persuading the West that it is the only haven of modernism and democracy in this part of the world and that is the champion of the Christian-Judaic civilisation there.

Despite their close relevance to the issue of the protection of holy sites, the proposals contained in this paper fall in a register that bypasses the coexistence of Palestinians and Israelis to that of religions, cultures and civilisations.

The group of countries will go on shrinking as time goes by. It is already more of a global village where boundaries are disappearing, interests are merging and the space reserved for the sovereignty of states is dwindling before the overwhelming and invading presence of globalisation forces and change.

Is it conceivable that in this world which is based on mutual dependence and that is aspiring to stability and peace, Islamic and Christian holy sites in the capital of peace should still suffer the spectre of occupation, violation, displacement and judaisation ?

(*) Professor of International Relations at the University Mohamed V in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco.

(1) GA Res 181 UN.GAOR.UN DOC A/519P. 146, 1947. The General Assembly revisited the issue of the internalisation of Jerusalem in its Resolution 194 of 11/12/1948 when it recommended a special status for Jerusalem whereby the city would be placed under UN control. Cf. GA Res. 194 UN.GAOR.UN DOC A/810. 1948.

(2) Speech of Pope Jean Paul II when he received His Majesty King Hassan II. CF. Al Quds Committee : Achievements and Prospects’. Published by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, page 79.

(3) Cf. Article 11 of the agreement signed between the Vatican and Israel. Palestinian Studies Magazine, p. 222.

(4) General Assembly Resolution No. 2253. Fifth extraordinary session of 4/7/1967. The same position was adopted in General Assembly Resolution 2254 of 14/7/1967.

(5) Security Council Decision No. 250 of 27/4/1968, and Resolution No. 256 of 2/5/1968.

(6) The Security Council Resolution of 16/9/1968, and Resolution No. 267 of  3/7/1969.

(7) Security Council Resolution No. 271 of 16/9/1969, issued after the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque on 21/8/1980.

(8) Security Council Decision No. 78 of 20/8/1980.

(9) For more details, cf. Tayssir Chawkat Annablussi : “Israeli Occupation of Arab Territories : A study of the Reality of Occupation in the light of General International Law”.

(10) Final draft approved on 19/3/1993. Cf. Ussama Halabi on “Legal Status of Al Quds and its Arab Inhabitants”. Palestinian Studies Institute, 1997, p. 69.

(11) Aziz Haidar : “Israeli Policy on the Future of Al Quds”. Palestinian Politics Magazine, edition 13, 1997, p. 132.

(12) Synopsis of the principles of the Labour Party and decisions of the 5th party congress in 1992. Cf. Aziz Haidar “Israeli Policy Towards Al Quds”. Palestinian Studies Magazine. Edition 13, 1997, p. 138.

(13) Ahmad Sedqi Dajani : “Dangers of Al Quds Agreement and how to Confront them”.  2nd session of the Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco. Amman, 1996, p. 127

(14) Jamal Ali Zahrane : “International and Regional Systems between Continuity and Change”. First edition, 1996, p. 126.

Gold Dore (1995) : Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Issue. Study No 7, Tel Aviv University. The Jeffe Centre for Strategic Studies. Gold Dore is a political adviser for the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. Cf. Aziz Haidar, ibid. p. 141

(15) Omar, Dr. Mahjour : “The Arab Al Quds”, edition 2326 of 30/10/1996.

(16) Lecture delivered by the late Faical Al Husseini in Paris in December 1997 on : “Al Quds : A History and an Identity”, at the invitation of the Arab-European Studies Centre

(17) Cf. Dr. Ibrahim Abrach : “Two Years after the Intifada : Where to”. Al Furqan Magazine, edition 48/2003, p. 14.

(18) For further details, cf. Ahmad Sedqi Dajani : “Towards Universality”. Dar Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi, 2003, p. 434.