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Human Civilizations and Cultures: from Dialogue to Alliance

Proceedings of the International Symposium

organized by the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization -ISESCO-

in cooperation with the Tunisian Ministry of Culture and Heritage Preservation

Tunis, 30/1 - 1/2/2006

 

Contents

 

The Role of Dialogue and Other Elements

in Cross-cultural Alliances and Peace Efforts

Dr. Josef Seifert(*)

 

1- What is Dialogue?

A. Dialogues as Inter-Human Conversations

To approach our topic, we should first clarify what we mean by dialogue. Greek dictionaries translate dialogue (diálogon) usually as conversation. A dialogue, in contrast to a monologue (that can also take on dialogical form, however, as Augustine’s Soliloquia), presupposes two or more partners. These partners must be persons and cannot be animals with which we can have conversations in a merely analogous, even though significant, sense. Husband and wife, father and mother, parents and children, friends, relatives, acquaintances, persons whom we just met on a train, participants in Radio shows and Video Conferences, emissaries of states, they all can be engaged in dialogue in the wide sense that is a primary form of interpersonal communication.

But not any form of intersubjective communication between persons, through looks, through gestures, through facial expressions or sexual intercourse, are called dialogues; rather, in the strict sense of the term, only conceptual and verbal ones are called such.

B. Dialogues as Transcendent Conversations with Non-human Interlocutors

The persons who partake in the dialogue do not necessarily have to be humans, however. In fact, the first records of dialogues in the Bible are between God and the first man, between the first woman and the devil, and between the first couple and God. Also Abraham arguing with God about how many just persons are required to live in Sodom and Gomorrah if the city is to be saved, is engaged in an extraordinarily vivid and dramatic dialogue with God animated by his compassion for the inhabitants of a rotten city. And many other dialogues of prophets and mystics, who converse with souls, angels, or God, do not have human interlocutors.

In fact, one may say that each prayer, be it of repentance, of gratitude, of praise, of worship or of petition, is such a transcendent dialogue in which the human person is speaking and believes, as a condition of the very essence and meaning of any prayer, that God or Saints are listening and answering in some mysterious fashion. Thus the person with whom one converses or who speaks does not have to be human.

C. Differentiation of Dialogues according to Their Character and Theme: Theoretical and Philosophical or Scientific versus Pragmatic Political and Economic Dialogues, and the Theoretical Aspects of the Latter

Dialogues also play a crucial and thematic, but very different role in philosophy and in the dialectics peculiar to it, in the raising and answering objections, etc. Just think of the masterful linguistically embodied dialogues in the Platonic Writings.

Dialogues that play a significant part in the political and peace-process are of quite another sort, not only because they have a different end, not just knowledge, as the philosophical or scientific dialogue, alliances, actions, etc., but also because they seek a more basic understanding of things sufficient for action, and not the type of purely theoretical comprehension of the world at which scientific or philosophical dialogues aim.

Yet while political dialogues have concrete and specific practical goals, for example ending the long-lasting conflict, terrorism and counterterrorism between Palestine and Israel, and establishing finally peace in the region, and are thus pragmatic in character, also political dialogues and peace-talks should never be entirely instrumentalized or even consist of pragmatic lies with the sole goal of reaching an intended purpose. No, given the fact that affirmations and opinions are uttered in political dialogues, and also a philosophical, scientific, ethical and religious vision of man and of justice rules them, they, too, should first aim at truth about man, justice, and the good, and only then to practical action.

Equally pragmatic and goal-directed dialogues play a role in buys and sales, in business relations of any kind, and in many other contexts.

Depending on the circumstances and level on which they occur, as well as on the goal they pursue, dialogues have a very different character and purpose such that not all conversations are called dialogues in the same sense.

All forms of dialogue, however, imply the conversation between at least two fictional or real persons; when just one person speaks or argues with himself, we speak of a monologue.

D. Difference between Dialogues and Other Thoughts, Social Acts, and Usages of Language

A conversation or dialogue differs as well from many other acts, thoughts and uses of language: from giving commands, making promises, promulgating laws, pronouncing sentences in court, etc. mainly by dealing chiefly with questions, answers, affirmations or arguments. Given the fact that a dialogue in the stricter sense deals with judgments and questions, it also differs as well from mutual insults as from the peaceful conversation of two persons who mutually declare their love for each other; for the act of declaring one’s love differs from a mere communication or uttering of an opinion which would then become object of a dialogue. Declaring one’s love is a very unique social act, addressed to another person and in need to be heard by the other in order to be what it is.

Now while this is also true of dialogue, the role of declarations of love is not simply to communicate something to someone (this could be done to any other person), or the different act of conversing with him or her, but to reveal and to reach the other person with the act of our love – by means of declaring “I love you”. Thus a declaration of love differs from a dialogue about love.

E. Fundamental Distinctions between Real and Fictional, as well as between Actually Occurring and Embodied (Objectivized) Dialogues

From a real dialogue between different existing persons we distinguish a fictional dialogue between fictional or fictionally transformed persons, as possibly the participants of many Platonic, and the personages of most literary dialogues as well as of the parables in the Gospels are or can be interpreted to be. Here we are not faced with a real dialogue that can only take place between existing persons but we encounter imaginary dialogues and yet may encounter in these the essence, essential topics and forms of dialogue or symbolic analogous representations of real but transcendent and extra-human dialogues, such as when the dialogue of a parable, speaking of a father and his son, who returned home, analogously indicates a kind of metaphysical dialogue between God and man.

Given the unreality of a fictional dialogue and of its participants, such literary dialogues differ essentially from dialogues of real persons. Moreover, a literary dialogue cannot directly lead to International Alliances or help in peace-processes. No Shakespearean or Platonic dialogue per se can achieve peace or bring about cross-cultural alliances.

Literary dialogues may indirectly play an extremely helpful role for alliances and peace-processes, however, because they may bring out even more clearly than real dialogues (with all their respective contingencies) what the true issues at stake in a given dialogue might be, or what the sound reasons for alliances and peace are, or what the many other themes and fruits of dialogues are.

We must not only differentiate between dialogues and other forms of social acts and communications, and between real and fictional dialogues, but also distinguish the original lived form of real dialogues from their embodied form after they have been written down in minutes or other linguistic documentations.

These real but no longer actual, these objectivized and conceptualized as well as linguistically embodied dialogues differ both from fictional ones and from actually occurring conversations.

Both sorts of never or of no longer actual dialogues can be of great importance for real life, however, and even more so than actually and presently occurring ones. In this way, the dialogues between Job and his friends as recorded in the Bible may be of greater consoling and inspiring power than actual talks, or the dialogues between a pagan, a Jew, a Muslim and a Christian written by Raimundus Lullus may have led to better practical consequences and cross-cultural alliances than many real but less intelligent and less wise dialogues. Or consider the extraordinarily beautiful, wise, and profound speeches and dialogues on war and peace that we encounter in Shakespearean plays such as in Henry V.

Notwithstanding their beauty and depth, however, their role for peace and cross-cultural alliances can only be very indirect: for only when real persons read and understand them, and only when they act upon them and apply their results to real problems in the real world, or when they actually revive and conduct them in an actualized version, not in their purely conceptual and linguistic forms, literary dialogues can give rise to effects in the real world.

Therefore, we may say that the dialogues considered by our Tunis Conference are another sort of dialogues than all of these literalized forms of dialogue. We consider the role of actual and real ones; in fact – prescinding here from the mentioned very broad sense of the term in which any conversation, whether real or fictional, is called dialogue, for example in the theory of drama and in novels – the most proper meaning of the term dialogue refers only to real ones. Actual dialogues, then, are real conversations between real persons. Here alone we find embodied and realized what a dialogue truly is.

However, this should not make us unjust against fictional dialogues. For in terms of the purely intellectual values of truth, of good questions and answers, of intelligent propositions and logical reasoning, the ideal and partly fictional dialogues of Plato, Raimundus Lullus, Erasmus, and of many other thinkers are far superior to the actually occurring and often superficial and stupid dialogues.

F. Dialogues in a Further and more Specific Sense within Real Dialogues of Real Persons: The Moments of Commonality and Difference in Cross-Cultural and Inter-religious Dialogues

Let us, however, return to the real dialogues that real persons engage in and that constitute important forms of actual communication between them and hold a significant role in cross-cultural contacts.

The partners of such a dialogue not solely listen but also speak, not solely speak but also listen; and they speak so that the other hears and receives what they say; and to listen not to anything but to what the other says. Only then can we speak of a real dialogue or of a conversation in accordance with the original Greek word diálogo7 (lit. counter-versation; conversation).

Dialogues are conducted for at least three very different purposes: 1) in order to find out the real opinions and beliefs of other persons and their arguments in favor of their convictions; 2) to reach in the end, and its ideal result, knowledge of truth; 3) to realize goals outside dialogue and knowledge such as cross-cultural alliances, peace, harmony, end of war, economic relations, lifting of sanctions, intercultural associations, etc.

G. Not all Conversations are Dialogues in a Third and still Stricter Sense

Now, to speak of a dialogue, it is not enough to have a real conversation between real persons motivated by such goals. Dialogue in a still more precise sense presupposes some form of difference or conflict of opinion, some dia-legein or arguing against or with each other. Thus dialogue presupposes both some common and some different elements, opinions, interests, etc. A purely and solely peaceful and harmonious conversation between persons who agree on everything, while possibly fulfilling the highest ideal of interpersonal communication and conversation, is not a dialogue in this still more specific sense.

Also a conversation between two people who argue with or against each other’s position is not yet a dialogue. If they both shout and fight with each other, or insult each other, such a conversation is a fight or mutual offense but no dialogue.

Dialogue much rather presupposes some degree of peacefulness and of mutual effort to understand each other, we may say it is permeated by a “respectful disagreement” and animated by the zeal to lessen or overcome these disagreements.

Moreover, dialogue presupposes that the two partners in dialogue do not disagree on everything and that, in other words, there is some common ground of agreement.

Thus dialogue presupposes both some common and some different elements, opinions, interests, etc.

H. Dialogues must be “for the sake of Truth and True Values”

But dialogues would be a sad spectacle indeed if that were all that is to them. For only fools can content themselves with just learning the opinions of others and wherein he agrees or disagrees with others. No, the secret life-nerve of dialogues is the search for truth, and, more specifically, some openness to look for everything good, true and just in what the other party says and in what applies to what the other says but appears or is overlooking.

 

2. Elements beyond Dialogue - Importance and Limits of the Role of Dialogue in Peace Efforts

Dialogue is very important in cross-cultural relations and alliances but is not all that is important for these. There are many elements of high significant here that are distinct from dialogues:

1. Objectives of dialogues: are many and these ends of the dialogue are a first kind of things that lie beyond dialogue itself: acquiring a better knowledge of things and of other persons; resolving personal or political conflicts of many kinds; collaborating better in economic, cultural, legal, scientific, or political activities, etc.

2. Dispositions and Attitudes of the Participants in a Dialogue as Presuppositions of Any (Fruitful) Dialogue: While dialogue is of extreme importance for intercultural relations and for peace-efforts, it is not at all the only thing that counts. We have already encountered some important inner attitudes between persons that are required for warm peace but, at least if they do not exist at all in a rudimentary form, will also undermine any peace, even “cold peace”.

Some of these attitudes refer to the dialogue itself as well as to its object and our knowledge thereof: such as an openness to understand the other position; searching and proceeding from some common grounds (Plato); respect for the freedom of thought of others that must not be threatened in dialogues by demagogical, political or social constraints; an unceasing openness, again and again manifested, to accept elements that seem to be true in the differing opinions of the other partner; some, at least minimal, awareness that we are not omniscient and therefore can reasonably expect some improvement of our own knowledge through the dialogue.

3. Respect for the Other Person and Our Own Person: Other elements that lie beyond dialogue regard the other person with whom we have dialogue: the most important one of these is a respect for the person with whom we converse; a respect that expresses itself also in politeness and in a respectful tone (a shouting match is not a dialogue) and is opposite to hatred, to wishing that the other person would not exist. Under their auspices no dialogue is possible.

Authentic dialogue is also impossible with a person who has no self-respect for his or her own dignity, who hates herself or is servile, without any will of her own and detracts herself in a way that makes real dialogue impossible. This also applies to the next element:

4. Respect for the National, Human or also Political Community of the Partners in Dialogue: The situation is different, though usually likewise grave, if the desire of one partner in dialogue is not directed at the destruction or extinction of the other person but only at the elimination of a community to which he or she belongs of which they even represent in the dialogue. Most grave is a lack of respect for the value and genius of the national or familial community to which the other person belongs.

It is a different matter if one only wishes to eliminate a state, which can seem wise and justified, as in the case of an almost entire elimination of the Vatican Church State in order to free the Church for spiritual affairs. Yet even though it is in principle possible to conduct a fruitful dialogue about the elimination of an Institution or state, often only a private dialogue with a person who wishes that the state we represent should not exist, but no political dialogue is possible under these premises.

Especially if one wishes in a purely destructive way that the state to which another person belongs should not exist at all, be erased from the political face of the earth, or incorporated in another state, even when one has some good and just reasons to believe that the foundation of a state or a conquest that led to it, were unjust, one will destroy very often the basis of any dialogue if one does not respect the right to exist of the political community to which the other belongs. A simple return to a status quo that ignores the historical facts is both impossible and entails new injustices, thus making at least political dialogue impossible or extremely difficult, nay hopeless.

Countless conflicts of this sort, whether in Südtirol, or in Croatia and Serbia, whether in Israel and Palestine, or in Russia and France, have led to conflicts and wars throughout history. And often dialogue is extremely difficult or altogether impossible as long as the aim of one side remains the dissolution of the political community to which the other belongs rather than a limited and realizable justice under the historical circumstances. Depending on the kind of community in question, the obstacles to dialogue vary greatly if its dissolution is insisted on.

It is the most serious obstacle to dialogue if the elements of not acknowledging the political community or autonomy of the other are combined with the lack of respect and affirmation of the other person. Then, in a climate of rejection of the political community to which the other belongs, coupled with a hatred of persons, no dialogue at all is possible. Other elements that lie beyond dialogue itself are:

5. The actual fruits of dialogue: These fruits are many but none of them is part of the dialogue itself, which would then possibly degenerate into a sort of l’art pour l’art, nor are its fruits automatically achieved by the sole dialoguing, but these fruits require efforts on both sides: the most important and immediate fruits are mutual understanding, knowledge of reality, improvement of relations, and peace. We must identify still another element distinct from dialogue and yet most important for peace-efforts and international relations, especially between enemy countries:

6. Other Acts Distinct from Dialoguing: While many or all things and states of affairs can be objects of dialogue, not all inter-subjective speaking and relating has the character of a dialogue. When one person has wronged another one, their speaking and relating with each other will not be primarily a dialoguing but involve other acts: asking for forgiveness and, as a response to it, actual forgiveness or denial thereof. And these acts surpass the scope of a dialogue.

 

3. Integration of Dialogue in a Broader Context -Illustration of the further Conditions of Peace through the examples of Justice and Forgiveness (Reconciliation)

It is most important to see that dialogue alone can never accomplish peace. Above and beyond inner acts and attitudes, also deeds must follow words.

It has often been observed that without justice and at least an honest effort to serve it, there will be no peace. And while justice can greatly be facilitated by dialogue, it is realized in it only in the form of uttering just words and judgments about other cultures, religions and individuals. But to realize justice more amply requires many more things: a certain kind of constitution which entails a recognition of natural law and fundamental human rights, above all the fundamental human right to life for all. But it is not enough if the constitution is just. Its justice as constitutional recognition of fundamental human dignity and human rights must also be embodied in laws: legal justice also encompasses the implementation of concrete laws that stand in harmony with fundamental human dignity and human rights, the elimination of unjust laws, racist laws, laws permitting slavery even in states that have espoused declarations of universal human rights. It also must avoid or abolish countless other forms of injustice in laws. Justice in the distribution of goods, distributive justice, is an important part of justice without which no peace can coexist in and between cultural communities but that goes far beyond dialoguing. Just laws also must entail a freedom of speech and of religion, as long as no other rights or fundamental goods are threatened by the abuse of freedom, respect for rights of minorities, and sometimes even the right of smaller communities and minorities to establish autonomous states if they so desire and do not violate other rights. Without acting to implement justice in all these realms of society, no justice and consequently no peace can prevail.

Justice also includes punitive justice: crimes have to be punished, the price has to be paid if we acted dishonestly, unjustly, meanly, diabolically; if we calumniated, lied, cheated, wronged, murdered the other. Hence no society will have peace without punitive justice. If the state does not provide it, its society will not stay clear of often unjust lynch justice as formerly practiced in the Wild West and before the establishment of constitutional states resting on principles of law, and terrorism will flourish. This terrorism must not be fought primarily in a war against terror but in establishing the just order whose collapse led to terror.

But even a perfectly just society in all domains would not necessarily be peaceful or conducive to cross-tribal, cross-national and cross-cultural alliances on the basis of justice alone. If we consider a society as that of Rwanda, Nigeria, the Balkan states, the Jewish community after the Second World War, or other survivors of genocide, peace requires other conditions beyond justice. For once millions of members of a tribe or country have been murdered by members of another tribe or country, or, closer to home, once we have offended and wronged each other, justice and suits filed at court, just punishment for thousands and hundreds of thousands of criminals, or even capital punishment for the worst criminals against humanity, will not bring about peace and alliances of peoples, as long as no mercy, no forgiveness, no love will prevail. In this sense, the sources of peace are dried out and closed in a society or community in which nothing but justice prevails, if no forgiveness, no benevolence, no asking for forgiveness exist.

The ultimate source and soul of peace therefore is love and willingness to forgive. Only love can heal wounds, overcome contentions and bitterness, conquer hatred, and without its heavenly dew no perfect peace will ever descend upon our troubled and broken earth.

 


 

(*) Internationale Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein und an der Pontifícia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago.

 

   

Publications of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

-ISESCO- 1428H/2007 A.D

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